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INTRODUCTION 
“Coastal Louisiana is vanishing,”1 and the state’s citizens are becoming 
aware of that reality.2 From 1932 to 2010, the state of Louisiana has 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by TAYLOR BOUDREAUX. 
 1. DAVID M. BURLEY, LOSING GROUND: IDENTITY AND LAND LOSS IN 
COASTAL LOUISIANA 5 (2010). 
 2. Poll Shows that Louisiana Residents Want Oil Companies to Pay for Damage 
Done to the Coast, RESTORE LA. NOW (Nov. 22, 2013), http://restorelouisiananow 
.org/poll_shows [perma.cc/H6YA-5EYG] [hereinafter Poll Results] (poll showing 




diminished by 1,883 square miles.3 Many Louisianans may not have known 
much about wetlands in years past, but disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and 
Rita, concerns over rising sea levels, and the BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico have brought the coast’s problems to the public’s attention. One 
cannot realistically attach such an extreme loss—spanning over a majority 
of the past century—to any one cause because the loss is the result of a 
number of factors.4 The most prominent suspects are the Mississippi River 
Delta’s “sedimen[t] deprivation,”5 sea level rise,6 and commercial development 
of coastal wetlands.7 
Crude oil and natural gas production has drastically increased in 
Louisiana over much of the last century,8 and the petroleum industry’s 
economic impact on the state has grown accordingly.9 That development 
has not been without negative side effects, however; studies connecting the 
energy industry’s coastal operations to the dramatic land loss have put these 
                                                                                                             
that citizens have substantial concern over protecting the wetlands from coastal 
erosion and improving flood protection in their parish). 
 3. BRADY R. COUVILLION ET AL., LAND AREA CHANGE IN COASTAL LOUISIANA 
FROM 1932 TO 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3164/down 
loads/SIM3164_Pamphlet.pdf [perma.cc/6K7W-F8NW] (“Trend analyses from 1985 
to 2010 show a wetland loss rate of 16.57 square miles per year. If this loss were to 
occur at a constant rate, it would equate to Louisiana losing an area the size of one 
football field per hour.”). 
 4. See Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana is Losing a Football Field of Wetlands an 
Hour, New U.S. Geological Survey Study Says, NOLA.COM (June 2, 2011, 9:37 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/06/louisiana_is_losing_a_football
.html [perma.cc/R8A4-E65J] (quoting a USGS geographer, David M. Burley, Brady 
Couvillion, and the director of the USGS National Wetlands Research Center in 
Lafayette, Phil Turnipseed).  
 5. Id.  
 6. Saskia De Melker, Native Lands Wash Away as Sea Levels Rise, PBS (June 
1, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/climate-change-jan-
june12-louisianacoast_05-30/ [perma.cc/263S-YZVS].  
 7. Bob Marshall, Science to be Key Factor in Lawsuit Against Oil and Gas 
Companies for Coastal Loss, LENS (July 23, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://thelensnola.org 
/2013/07/23/science-to-be-key-factor-in-lawsuit-against-oil-and-gas-companies-for- 
coastal-loss/ [perma.cc/53BY-A2PC].  
 8. See Louisiana Energy Facts and Figures, LA. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., http: 
//dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=208 [perma.cc/2S 
K4-6ADT] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
 9. Renita D. Young, Oil and Gas Industry Continues to Strongly Support 
Louisiana, Study Shows, NOLA.COM (July 11, 2014, 2:33 AM), http://www.nola 
.com/business/baton-rouge/index.ssf/2014/07/oil_and_gas_industry_continues.html 
[perma.cc/THG7-969J].  




companies at the center of governmental and public scrutiny.10 The board of 
commissioners for the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East 
(“SLFPA-E”) was well aware of these studies’ findings.11 Armed with those 
findings,12 the board filed suit against almost 100 oil, gas, and pipeline 
companies13 that have operated in the southeast portion of the state, 
specifically in the “Buffer Zone.”14 The SLFPA-E, tasked with the 
construction and maintenance of flood prevention systems in the New 
Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain areas,15 argued that the defendants’ 
production operation negatively affected the wetlands that act as a 
preventative barrier or initial line of flood defense,16 which made the board’s 
ability to carry out its duties more burdensome.17 The lawsuit prayed for 
injunctive relief and damages, asserting negligence, strict liability, natural 
servitude of drainage, public nuisance, private nuisance, and breach of 
contract.18 
                                                                                                             
 10. See Alisha A. Renfro, New Study Examines Oil and Gas Production’s 
Increased Effects on Louisiana Coastal Land Loss, RESTORE MISS. RIVER 
DELTA (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.mississippiriverdelta.org/blog/2012/01/11/new-
study-examines-oil-and-gas-production%E2%80%99s-increased-effects-on-louisiana 
-coastal-land-loss/ [perma.cc/YT3S-LPJ3]. 
 11. Marshall, supra note 7. 
 12. Melker, supra note 6; Marshall, supra note 7. 
 13. Mark Schleiftstein, Historic Lawsuit Seeks Billons in Damages from Oil, 
Gas, Pipeline Industries for Wetlands Losses, NOLA.COM (July 24, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/07/historic_east_bank_levee_au
tho.html [perma.cc/E5KB-UQYT]. 
 14. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 7, Bd. of Comm’rs of the 
Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 13-6911 (La. Dist. Ct. 
July 24, 2013). The “Buffer Zone” is described as extending “from East of the 
Mississippi River through the Breton Sound Basin, the Biloxi Marsh, and the 
coastal wetlands of eastern New Orleans and up to Lake St. Catherine.” Id. 
 15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.2(2) (Supp. 2015).  
 16. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 8–10. 
 17. Id. at 3.  
 18. Id. at 17–23. Months after removal, the federal district court dismissed 
SLFPA-E’s suit for failure to state a claim. See Mark Schleifstein, Federal Judge 
Dismisses Levee Authority’s Wetlands Damage Lawsuit Against Oil, Gas 
Companies, NOLA.COM (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:52 PM), http://www.nola.com/environ 
ment/index.ssf/2015/02/federal_judge_dismisses_east_b.html [perma.cc/KZ4G-KW 
EL]. This dismissal order did not address Act 544 and its proposed effect on SLFPA-
E. See id. Additionally, the decision will inevitably be appealed. See Mark 
Schleifstein, Appeal of Wetlands Damage Suit Against Energy Companies Will 
Continue, NOLA.COM (March 2, 2015, 6:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment 
/index.ssf/2015/03/continue_the_appeal_of_wetland.html [perma.cc/H4W3-8V28]. 
Because the dismissal order did not discuss Act 544’s application or legality, the issue 




The oil and gas industry, as well as the Louisiana governor, adamantly 
opposed the lawsuit.19 Whether or not the industry’s political influence 
prompted the legislative action, the legislature also expressed its disapproval 
with the suit and acted accordingly—the 2014 legislative session saw 18 
bills that related to the litigation.20 Ultimately, the legislature passed Senate 
Bill 469, which the governor eventually signed into law as Act 544 (“the 
Act”). Among other things, this law provides that “no state or local 
governmental entity” has a cause of action related to any coastal activity, 
commercial or otherwise, subject to regulation under particular state and 
federal law.21 Interestingly, to achieve the conspicuous aim of the 
legislators’ efforts, the law provides that its effects shall apply to all “claims 
existing or actions pending on the Act’s effective date” as well as those filed 
after that date.22 Legislators, commentators, and those potentially subject to 
the new law made clear that the Act’s legality and actual application are far 
from settled.23  
The law removed the board of commissioners’ legal standing and 
stripped a significant slice of authority from that constitutionally established 
governmental body.24 With such drastic consequences, constitutional 
arguments unsurprisingly followed the governor’s signature. Further, with 
only a cursory view of media headlines, Louisiana citizens are understandably 
concerned about whether the bill was in their best interest; the law precluded 
a local-area board from filing suit—an apparent attempt to hold the oil and 
gas industry accountable—against almost 100 companies in that industry.25 
A more tempered analysis of the situation, however, reveals the 
inappropriateness of the lawsuit and the true necessity of Act 544.  
This Comment suggests that Act 544, though an unusual law, is both 
legally sound and appropriate. The law has legislative precedent, backed by 
                                                                                                             
is still unresolved, making the legal and policy analyses relevant not only for this 
case’s final disposition but also for later analogous industry-wide lawsuits. 
 19. Mark Ballard, Louisiana House Votes to Kill Levee Board Lawsuit, 
ADVOCATE (May 29, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://theadvocate.com/home/9309334-
125/louisiana-house-votes-to-kill [perma.cc/4292-3QK4]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Act No. 544, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw), codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 49:214.36(O)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 22. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(O)(2). 
 23. See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 19.  
 24. Id. 
 25. These statistics illustrate the public’s perception that this lawsuit stood 
for “a symbol of Louisiana’s future.” Peter Moskowitz, In Louisiana, an 
Environmental Lawsuit Brings Hope for a New Chapter, ALJAZEERA AM. (Mar. 11, 
2014, 7:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/11/environmental-
activistshopealawsuitopensanewchapterinlahistory.html [perma.cc/FT57-GV24]. 




jurisprudential support, which leads to the conclusion that Act 544 is 
constitutional. The legislature did not overstep its authority simply because 
a pending suit was affected, nor did the law improperly violate the flood 
protection authority’s constitutional protections. The SLFPA-E’s particular 
constitutional and statutory origins make the authority susceptible to this 
type of legislative action. Further, the entity’s actual purpose within the 
state’s regulatory scheme supports the conclusion that the legislature acted 
appropriately despite counterbalancing policy concerns.  
Part I of this Comment sets out facts surrounding the board’s lawsuit 
and the legislature’s response, and provides context by comparing Act 544 
to similar laws. Part II describes and analyzes the legality of retroactive laws 
that apply to a particular target involved in pending litigation, ultimately 
concluding that Act 544 does not violate any constitutional prohibitions. 
Lastly, Part III argues that, in light of the alternatives to this legislative 
response, both Act 544’s means and its end are legitimate. A survey of this 
lawsuit’s role within the established regulatory framework surrounding the 
oil and gas industry reveals that Act 544 was the preferred solution when 
considering the destructive alternatives.  
I. HISTORY OF ACTION AND REACTION 
The Louisiana Legislature responded to the SLFPA-E’s expansive 
lawsuit by retroactively taking away its cause of action. The history and 
purpose of the SLFPA-E, the agency’s grounds for filing the lawsuit, and 
the legislature’s choice of responses provide essential context for analyzing 
the necessity of the legislative response in Act 544.  
A. Legislative Inducement: The Causes of Act 544 
Congress enacted the federal Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972 
due to a “national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, 
protection, and development of the coastal zone.”26 The comprehensive 
                                                                                                             
 26. 16 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012). Congress explicitly noted the oil and gas 
industry’s adverse effects on the environment. Id. § 1451(c) (“The increasing and 
competing demands upon the lands and waters of our coastal zone occasioned by 
population growth and economic development, including requirements for 
industry, commerce, residential development, recreation, extraction of mineral 
resources and fossil fuels, transportation and navigation, waste disposal, and 
harvesting of fish, shellfish, and other living marine resources, have resulted in 
the loss of living marine resources, wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent and 
adverse changes to ecological systems, decreasing open space for public use, and 
shoreline erosion.”). 




scheme provided federal grants to states that submitted their own coastal 
management program for approval.27 Louisiana’s submission was approved 
in 1980, and the state’s Department of Natural Resources administers the 
scheme.28 The legislature enacted the approved scheme under the State and 
Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978.29 The main features of 
the federal and state regulations concerned permitting and oversight of 
coastal land use.30  
In addition to coastal land use, it is necessary for Louisiana to monitor 
and control the flooding tendencies along the Mississippi River and the Gulf 
Coast, given the state’s position in relation to these two bodies of water. 
Thus, over many years, Louisiana established multiple levee districts whose 
governing boards were charged with constructing and maintaining 
protective barriers, which operate as a last line of defense for the people and 
property behind their banks.31 After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated 
the levee system surrounding the New Orleans area in 2005, raising concerns 
over the districts’ efficiency and political influence,32 the legislature amended 
the state constitution to integrate several of these districts under regional flood 
protection authorities.33 SLFPA-E is one of the two existing authorities.34  
Before 2006, the East Jefferson, Lake Borgne, Orleans, and Tangipahoa 
Levee Districts dealt with various flood protection projects in their 
jurisdictions.35 The state constitution established the SLFPA-E’s oversight 
                                                                                                             
 27. Id. § 1455(b)–(d). 
 28. Coastal Management Programs, OFF. FOR COASTAL MGMT. NOAA, 
http://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/#louisiana [perma.cc/UG5D-MWSA] (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2015).  
 29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:214.21 to :214.42 (2012 & Supp. 2015).  
 30. See id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1451–66. 
 31. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:307(A)(1) (2005) (The Orleans 
Levee District is instructed “to locate, relocate, construct, maintain, extend, and 
improve levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, breakwaters, water-basins, and 
other works . . . .”). 
 32. Mark Schleifstein, East Bank Levee Authority Meets for First Time with 
New Bobby Jindal Appointments, NOLA.COM (Oct. 17, 2013, 7:19 PM), http: 
//www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/10/east_bank_levee_authority_
meet.html [perma.cc/4KZ2-DC92].  
 33. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 38.1.  
 34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.1B(1)(a) (Supp. 2015). The legislature 
established this authority that includes the East Jefferson, Lake Borgne, Orleans, 
and Tangipahoa Levee Districts. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., id. § 38:307(A)(1) (“The [Orleans Levee District] shall have full 
and exclusive right, jurisdiction, power, and authority to locate, relocate, construct, 
maintain, extend, and improve levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, breakwaters, 
water basins, and other works in relation to such projects and to conduct all 




of the districts with “the purposes of constructing and maintaining levees, 
levee drainage, flood protection, and hurricane flood protection within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the authority. . . .”36 Under the Louisiana 
Constitution, the SLFPA-E has the power to levy taxes, employ and provide 
for its employees, and to own, construct, and maintain property.37 The 
SLFPA-E oversees the flood protection systems in its statutorily defined 
jurisdiction and shares responsibility with the federal government for 
operating and maintaining the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction 
System.38 The board of commissioners of the SLFPA-E may enter into 
contracts for the purpose of carrying out its powers, including “construction, 
operation, and maintenance of any facilities and improvements” of projects 
under their governing laws.39 Although the flood authority governs and is 
comprised of these individual levee districts, the law treats the flood 
authority in every respect as a distinct levee district.40 Notably, the flood 
protection authority has the power to sue and be sued, just as the individual 
levee districts.41 
Perhaps influenced by public perception along the coast,42 the SLFPA-
E filed a lawsuit for damages and injunctive relief, naming 97 oil, gas, and 
pipeline companies as defendants and asserting 6 separate grounds for 
liability,43 centering on the defendants’ contribution to and exacerbation of 
Louisiana’s coastal land loss.44 The SLFPA-E alleged that the citizens and 
property within its jurisdiction were at a greater risk of flooding because of 
the defendants’ underground drilling operations, the overexpansion and 
                                                                                                             
dredging operations necessary in connection therewith or incidental thereto along, 
over, and on the shores, bottom, and bed of Lake Pontchartrain in the parish of 
Orleans . . . .”); Mission Statement, ORLEANS LEVEE DIST., http://www.or 
leanslevee.com/Mission%20Statement.htm [perma.cc/7WMS-8PET] (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2015) (“The District is primarily responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of levees, embankments, seawalls, jetties, breakwaters, water basins, 
and other hurricane and flood protection improvements surrounding the City of New 
Orleans, including the southern shores of Lake Pontchartrain and along the 
Mississippi River. The District is responsible for the maintenance of 104.8 miles of 
levees and floodwalls, 200 floodgates, 103 flood valves, and 2 flood control 
structures.”). 
 36. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 38.1.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 12–14. 
 39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.2(C).  
 40. Id. § 330.1(A)(1).  
 41. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:309(B) (2012).  
 42. Poll Results, supra note 2. 
 43. Petition for Damages and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 17–23. 
 44. Id. at 8–11.  




failed maintenance of dredged canals, and other violations of state and federal 
permitting standards.45 These actions led the board to request damages arising 
from the “exponentially” increasing costs to carry out its duties.46 In effect, 
the entity asserted that private actors were liable for putting increased strain 
on its ability to cover its rising operating costs. The SLFPA-E went beyond 
asking for compensatory relief and requested that defendants take proactive 
measures that the board believed would protect the coast from future land 
loss.47  
Attempts to kill the lawsuit began with an attack on SLFPA-E’s ability 
to contract with its legal representation48 because the entity hired attorneys 
on what appeared to be a contingency fee basis.49 Those opposed to the 
lawsuit—including legislators and parties inside the industry—argued that 
the political body did not have the authority to contract with special counsel 
in this way and, further, that the contract was not properly presented to the 
attorney general for approval.50 The SLFPA-E’s opposition cited apparent 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 2–8. 
 47. Id. at 12–15. Among these forward-looking requests were for the 
defendants to carry out “restoration of the coastal land loss,” including the 
following: “the backfilling and revegetating of each and every canal dredged by 
[Defendants];” “abatement and restoration activities determined to be appropriate, 
including but not limited to, wetlands creation, reef creation, land bridge 
construction, hydrologic restoration, shoreline protection, structural protection, 
bank stabilization, and ridge restoration;” and “[s]uch other and further relief 
which the Court deems necessary and proper.” Id. at 23–24. 
 48. The Louisiana Oil and Gas Association filed a separate suit against the 
state attorney general to stop the Authority’s attorney contract. See Petition for 
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Caldwell, No. 626798 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2014); Mark Schleifstein, Private 
Attorneys Working for Louisiana Attorney General Can Do So with Contingency 
Fee Contracts, Judge Rules, NOLA.COM (March 10, 2014, 1:38 PM), http://www 
.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/03/private_attorneys_working_for.html 
[perma.cc/X5QZ-5K79]. 
 49. Schleiftstein, supra note 13. The contract provided that the firms would 
receive 32.5% of the first $100 million of the monetary award should the board 
prove to be successful, with a smaller percentage paid for any amount above $100 
million. Id. 
 50. See Mark Schleiftstein, Judge Upholds AG Buddy Caldwell’s Approval 
of Levee Authority’s Vote in Wetlands Damage Suit, NOLA.COM (Mar. 10, 2014, 
4:49 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/03/judge_upholds_at 
torney_general.html [perma.cc/5L72-P4LY]; Mark Schleifstein, Jindal Demands 
East Bank Levee Authority Drop Lawsuit Against Oil, Gas, Pipelines (July 24, 2013, 
6:41 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/07/jindal_demands 
_east_bank_levee.html [perma.cc/7AL2-GYNV]. 




violations of law regarding the state entity’s hiring of legal counsel,51 but 
the court rejected those arguments.52 After the defendants removed the suit 
to federal court,53 and the SLFPA-E established the validity of its attorney 
compensation, the levee board’s suit appeared to have overcome all remaining 
hurdles, except one—the political arena. 
B. Legislative Adjustment: The Legislature’s Response 
Several bills introduced in the 2014 legislative session set out to either 
directly or indirectly hamper the levee board’s lawsuit.54 Proposed 
legislation attacked nearly every aspect of the litigation, including the 
structure and nomination process of board members, the board’s ability to 
contract with attorneys, and restrictions on how potential award money 
would be handled.55 Though legislators proposed many bills, the legislature 
successfully passed what was perhaps the most effective bill. Act 544 
purports to strip the ability of “certain ‘state or local governmental 
entit[ies]’” to sue for violations of certain permitting schemes and other 
coastal activity.56 Some legislators labeled SLFPA-E’s litigation as “clear 
                                                                                                             
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.6 (Supp. 2015) (making the state Attorney 
General the Authority’s counsel); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:261 to :263 (2006) 
(requiring approval of entities’ “special counsel”). The Louisiana Oil and Gas 
Association advanced these arguments in a responsive lawsuit against Attorney 
General Caldwell. Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 4–
8, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. v. Caldwell, No. 626798 (La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2014).  
 52. Mark Schleifstein, Judge Rules New State Law Doesn’t Stop Levee 
Authority from Suing Oil Companies, NOLA.COM (Oct. 6, 2014, 9:51 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/10/state_judge_rules_law_pro
hibit.html [perma.cc/XD2A-XFG4]. 
 53. Mark Schleifstein, Environmental Lawsuit Against 92 Energy Companies 
Belongs in Federal Court, Judge Rules, NOLA.COM (June 28, 2014, 10:12 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2014/06/federal_judge_rules_east_
bank.html [perma.cc/KL2K-YFK4].  
 54. Ballard, supra note 19 (noting that about 18 bills were introduced that 
legislative session “to clip the wings of this litigation and similar lawsuits”).  
 55. Id.  
 56. Act No. 544, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw).  




violations of law” by a state agency57 under the terms of existing law.58 The 
legislature explicitly stated and expanded its understanding of existing 
law—only certain governmental entities have a cause of action for activity 
that certain state and federal regulations of the coast govern.59 The governor 
signed the law on June 6, 2014, ten months after SLFPA-E filed suit, and 
the law became effective that same day.60  
A majority of Act 544’s substance was originally contained in another 
bill, Senate Bill 531.61 Although both versions of the law were related to the 
general topic of enforcement remedies by entities that the Coastal Zone 
Management Program governed, Act 544’s final enacted language does not 
mirror the provisions within its original proposed form.62 Procedurally, this 
irregular presentation in the legislature made the law ripe for legal attacks, 
namely those based on the state constitutional provisions regarding a “title 
                                                                                                             
 57. Mark Schleifstein, Louisiana Senate Approves Legislation that Would Kill 
East Bank Levee Authority Wetland Lawsuit Against Energy Companies, NOLA.COM 
(May 12, 2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/senate 
_approves_legislation_th.html [perma.cc/JJ6Q-VMZC]. 
 58. Presumably, those legislators referred to Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 49:214.36(D), which provides a cause of action for claims similar to 
SLFPA-E’s to enumerated parties. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(D) (2012). 
 59. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:214.36(D) now provides the 
narrow exception to Act 544, meaning that the listed persons or entities in section 
(D) shall have a right of action specifically related to permitting violations under 
the Coastal Zone Management Act. See id. 
 60. Act 544 became effective upon the governor’s signature on June 6, 2014. 
Act No. 544, § 1, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw); Schleiftstein, supra note 13. 
 61. S.B. 531, 2014 Reg. Sess. (La. 2014), available at http://www.legis 
.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=225159 [perma.cc/4AXF-TF4Y]. Compare id. (“No 
state or local governmental entity, except the Department of Natural Resources, 
the attorney general, or the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, shall 
have, nor may pursue, any right or cause of action arising from or related to a state 
or federal permit issued pursuant to R.S. 49:214.21 et seq., 33 U.S.C. 1344 or 33 
U.S.C. 408 in the coastal area as defined by R.S. 49:214.2(4), violation thereof, 
or enforcement thereof, or for damages or other relief arising from or related to 
any of the foregoing. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any contractual claims that 
any state or local governmental entity may possess against the permittee are 
preserved.”), with Act No. 544, § 1, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw). 
 62. S.B. 469, as originally introduced, provided for amendments to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 214.36, relative to administrative and other enforcement 
procedures. S.B. 469, 2014 Reg. Sess. (La. 2014), available at http://www.legis 
.la.gov/legis/ViewDocument.aspx?d=880653 [perma.cc/S857-FRYF]. The final 
version of S.B. 469, enacted as Act 544, although related in subject and purpose, 
differed substantially from the original provisions. Act No. 544, 2014 La. Acts 
(Westlaw). 




indicative,” “germane amendments,” three readings, and local or special law 
advertisement.63  
The SLFPA-E further argued that the lawmakers’ rushed attempts to kill 
the lawsuit affected not only the bills’ procedural formalities but also its 
textual precision.64 Accordingly, in two separate lawsuits, SLFPA-E 
claimed that it was neither a “state nor a local governmental entity,” thus the 
law did not apply to its lawsuit.65 One state court has already determined 
that the Act missed its mark.66 Lastly, the need for the legislature’s swift 
response to the pending suit necessarily raised substantive concerns 
regarding the legal ability to reach back and take away a party’s cause of 
action.  
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT 544 
Aside from the political and ideological fire that this situation has 
stoked, Act 544 implicates several state and federal constitutional 
provisions. The legislature has made a conscious decision to reach back and 
directly intervene in a pending lawsuit that a constitutionally established 
entity filed.67 This raises concerns related to the federal and state contracts 
                                                                                                             
 63. Considering the extent of the procedural issues surrounding Act 544 is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. The constitutional section concerning the 
passage of bills requires that “[e]very bill shall contain a brief title indicative of 
its object,” that “[n]o bill shall be amended in either house to make a change not 
germane to the bill as introduced,” and that every “bill shall be read at least by 
title on three separate days in each house.” LA. CONST. art. III, § 15(A), (C), (D). 
Contingent upon the determinations regarding whether Act 544 is a local or 
special law, and whether the Act improperly deals with an enumerated, prohibited 
list of subjects, the law’s passage might have violated the constitutional 
requirements that local or special laws be published in affected areas for a set 
amount of time and in a particular manner. Id. § 13; see also infra Part II.2. 
 64. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Louisiana Act 544 at 10, Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. 
Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., No. 2:13-cv-05410 (E.D. La. June 5, 
2014) (“Act 544’s convoluted path through the Louisiana legislature imbued it 
with both textual and constitutional defects that cause it to be inapplicable as a 
viable defense to the plaintiffs’ claims.”).  
 65. Act No. 544, § 1, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw); Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Louisiana Act 544, 
supra note 64, at 10. 
 66. See Judgment, La. Oil & Gas Ass’n, Inc. v. Caldwell, No. C626798 (La. 
Dist. Ct. Dec. 3, 2014); Schleifstein, supra note 52. 
 67. See Jeff Adelson & Mark Ballard, Jindal Signs Bill that Could Kill 
Wetlands Suit, ADVOCATE (June 6, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.theneworleans 
advocate.com/news/9383128-171/jindal-signs-bill-that-would [perma.cc/SS3H-




and due process clauses.68 Additionally, Act 544 includes a savings clause 
for certain claims of all governmental entities, except those of a “local or 
regional flood protection authority,”69 which raises the concern that the 
legislature improperly aimed a local or special law at the SLFPA-E.70 
Further, the legislature’s choice to retroactively amend an existing body of 
law, which the court was likely to consider during the pending litigation, 
may have violated the constitutional mandate of separation of powers.71  
The legal issues raised by this legislation are not novel and have 
presented themselves in the context of analogous situations throughout other 
states’ and Louisiana’s legal history. In years past, Congress and state 
legislatures have responded to unwanted, politicized lawsuits against entire 
industries by stripping a plaintiff’s cause of action relating to the matter.72 
These legislative responses often share common traits. For example, many 
of these laws only affect a cause of action by government bodies73 and, 
similar to Act 544, usually contain exceptions based on breaches of warranty 
and contract.74 Most importantly, several of these statutes provide for 
retroactive application to pending suits.75 These past analogues provide 
legitimate legal and policy precedents to the Louisiana Legislature’s unusual 
action. Additionally, Louisiana’s constitution and interpretive jurisprudence 
make clear that Act 544’s application to the SLFPA-E does not violate the 
Louisiana Constitution.76 
                                                                                                             
HNCR]; Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. Flood Prot. Auth. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 
88 F. Supp. 3d 615 (E.D. La. 2015). The SLFPA-E is constitutionally established 
in article VI, section 38.1 of the Louisiana Constitution. LA. CONST. art. VI, §38.1. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1; LA. CONST. art. I, § 
23; id. art. I, § 2. 
 69. Act No. 544, § 5, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw). 
 70. LA. CONST. art. III, § 12(A).  
 71. Id. art. II §§ 1, 2.  
 72. See generally Bryce A. Jensen, Comment, From Tobacco to Health Care 
and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 1334 (2001) (discussing litigation against the lead paint, 
tobacco, and firearm manufacturer industries). 
 73. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
17-1314 (West Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.24a (West Supp. 
2009); see also Elizabeth T. Crouse, Note, Arming the Gun Industry: A Critique 
of Proposed Legislation Shielding the Gun Industry from Liability, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1346, 1390 n.70 (2004). 
 74. See Crouse, supra note 73, at 1358, 1390 n.70. 
 75. See id. at 1390 n.70. 
 76. A state court has ruled to the contrary, holding that Act 544 is not only 
inapplicable to the SLFPA-E but that the law is also unconstitutional. Judgment, 
supra note 66, at 2. The trial court found the law’s language did not encompass the 
unique status of the SLFPA-E, the law violated the Public Trust Doctrine in the 




A. The Supreme Court’s Precedent in Morial Supports Act 544’s 
Constitutionality  
In Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,77 the mayor of New Orleans sued 
a number of firearms manufacturers, retailers, distributors, and trade 
associations on the grounds that they were making and distributing 
unreasonably dangerous products to the city’s citizens.78 Similar to the flood 
authority’s approach, the city argued that the industry defendants’ actions 
strained its financial obligations by causing an increased need for the public 
services the city provided.79 The legislature, just as it did in response to the 
SLFPA-E suit, stripped certain parties of their ability to file suit on the 
matter.80 The law went into effect several months after the city filed suit and 
contained a separate section providing for retroactive effect to “all claims 
existing or actions pending on its effective date and all claims arising or 
actions on and after its effective date.”81 Mayor Morial argued, and the trial 
court found, that the responsive legislation was unconstitutional because the 
law violated plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights, improperly 
targeted plaintiffs with a special law, and affected the city’s constitutional 
right to file suit.82 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
city did not possess ordinary constitutional protections afforded to individuals.83 
                                                                                                             
Louisiana Constitution, the law violated the restrictions and notice requirements on 
special and local laws, and the law violated the principle of separation of powers. 
See id. at 1–2; Mark Schleifstein, Gov. Bobby Jindal Asks State Supreme Court to 
Uphold Law Banning Wetlands Damage Suit Against Oil Companies, NOLA.COM 
(Jan. 10, 2015, 9:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2015/01 
/gov_jindal_asks_state_supreme.html [perma.cc/6Z2S-UDCZ].  
 77. 785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 6. 
 79. Id. (“Specifically, the City’s petition alleges that ‘[a]ctions by defendants 
have caused the city to pay out large sums of money to provide services including 
but not limited to necessary police, medical, and emergency services, health care, 
police pension benefits and related expenditures, as well as to have lost substantial 
tax revenues due to lost productivity.’”).  
 80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799(A) (2008) (providing that causes of 
action were abolished for any “governing authority of any political subdivision or 
local or other governmental authority of the state,” reserving that right to the state 
alone).  
 81. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 6–7 (quoting LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 40:1799). 
 82. Id. at 8–9. Importantly, the defendant companies did not dispute the trial 
court’s decision as the holding related to a private citizen who joined the city’s 
suit. Id. at 9 (“Therefore, the issues relating to Mr. Ignatik’s rights are not before 
us and nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to affect his rights.”). 
 83. Id. at 11–13, 19. 




The Supreme Court’s analysis of these arguments controls the individual 
constitutional issues surrounding Act 544.  
1. Act 544 May be Applied Retroactively 
Section 2 of Act 544 explains that the law’s provisions shall apply to all 
claims or causes of action pending and filed in the future,84 and that Section 
1 strips the causes of action that any “state or local governmental entity” had 
relating to permitting schemes and various activities under state and federal 
law.85 Thus, read in conjunction, the two sections purportedly operate to take 
away a party’s ability to sue, notwithstanding the fact that a suit might 
already have been filed and litigation commenced. As a general rule, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the legislature is free to provide for 
a law’s retroactivity as long as that temporal application does not violate 
constitutional rules—specifically, those regarding disturbance of vested 
rights, impairment of contractual obligations,86 and violation of “the 
principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary.”87 
a. Contracts and Due Process Protections are Not Pertinent to Act 
544’s Intended Subject 
The legislature explicitly provided that Act 544 would apply 
retroactively,88 thus obviating the need for further inquiry into its temporal 
application.89 The true test for Act 544 will be accounting for potential 
constitutional violations.90 The retroactive nature of the law implicates the 
                                                                                                             
 84. Act. No. 544, § 2, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw). 
 85. Id. at § 1. 
 86. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 10 n.8 (citing Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 
783 So. 2d 1251 (La. 2001)).  
 87. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 404 (La. 
2005).  
 88. Act No. 544, § 2, 2014 La. Acts (Westlaw). 
 89. Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La. 1992) (“[Louisiana 
Civil Code article] 6 requires that we engage in a two-fold inquiry. First, we must 
ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding 
retrospective or prospective application. If the legislature did so, our inquiry is at 
an end. If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, 
procedural or interpretive.”). 
 90. See Bourgeois, 783 So. 2d at 1257 (“The principle contained in [Louisiana 
Civil Code article] 6, however, has constitutional implications under the Due 
Process and Contract Clauses of both the United States and Louisiana 
Constitutions, such that even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give 




due process and contracts clause provisions of both the Louisiana and 
United States constitutions.  
The contracts clauses of the Louisiana91 and United States Constitutions92 
are “virtually identical” and “substantially equivalent” in their protection of 
contractual obligations from retroactive laws.93 Additionally, both 
constitutions similarly prohibit affecting vested rights without due process of 
law.94 These clauses prevent a retroactive law’s application as applied to a 
private citizen, but Act 544 does not attempt to reach a citizen’s cause of 
action; thus, the intended subject of the law—a governmental body—may not 
have the same defense.95 
Similar to SLFPA-E, New Orleans had the “broad right” to pursue and 
defend the claims in Morial.96 The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately 
concluded that the city was unable to invoke either of the above protections 
because the Declaration of Rights in Article I of the Louisiana Constitution 
only contemplates the protection of a private person’s rights.97 Under settled 
                                                                                                             
a law retroactive effect, that law may not be applied retroactively if it would 
impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights.”). 
 91. LA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted.”). 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, 
ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”). 
 93. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. 2001) (quoting 
Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 728 (La. 1994)). 
 94. Carter v. State, 897 So. 2d 149, 151 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“Similar to the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution, 
Article I, § 2, provides that ‘[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, except by due process of law.’”). Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides, “nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV.  
 95. For application of these state and federal clauses to a private individual’s 
suit filed before the retroactive law, see example, Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish, 
982 So. 2d 795, 812 (La. 2008) (holding that the law there was “unconstitutional if 
made applicable to the pending, accrued, vested causes of action asserted by 
plaintiff and the class he represents”); Bourgeois, 783 So. 2d at 1259 (holding that 
the retrospective law, as applied to private plaintiffs, “would contravene due process 
guarantees by divesting them of their vested rights in their causes of action which 
accrued prior to the prior to the [sic] effective date of the Act”). 
 96. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 23 (Lemmon, J., concurring).  
 97. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (“The enumeration in this constitution 
of certain rights shall not deny or disparage other rights retained by the individual 
citizens of the state.” (emphasis added)); see also Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans 
Levee Dist. v. Dept. of Natural Res., 496 So. 2d 281, 287 (La. 1986) (“The 
organization of the 1974 Constitution indicates that Article I, the Declaration of 




jurisprudence, political or governmental entities have no due process or 
contractual obligation rights with regards to their creator’s actions.98 
Further, the state may waive or impair its subdivisions’ rights because those 
entities only exercise power that the legislature grants to them.99 This 
analysis holds true for both the due process and contractual obligation 
clauses under Louisiana’s constitution100 and the analogous provisions 
under the federal constitution.101 
Under the analysis in Morial, and the cases cited therein, Act 544 does 
not violate any constitutional protections given to SLFPA-E under these two 
clauses. Ordinarily, when a party files suit “prior to a change in the law, that 
                                                                                                             
Rights Article, protects the rights of individuals against unwarrantable 
government action and does not shield state agencies from law passed by the 
people’s duly elected representatives.”).  
 98. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 11 (quoting State ex rel. Kemp v. City of Baton 
Rouge, 40 So. 2d 477, 482 (La. 1949)).  
 99. Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 633 So. 2d 1235, 1247 (La. 
1994) (“This state may constitutionally pass retrospective laws waiving or 
impairing its own rights or those of its subdivisions, or imposing upon itself or its 
subdivisions new liabilities with respect to transactions already passed, as long as 
private rights are not infringed.”). 
 100. The state constitutional protections only apply to private persons. For an 
application of the state contracts clause protection, found in Article I, Section 23, 
of the Louisiana Constitution, see example, Rousselle, id. See also Olivedell 
Planting Co. v. Town of Lake Providence, 47 So. 2d 23, 27 (La. 1950) (“The 
provisions of our Constitution relating to the impairment of the obligations of 
contracts only apply to contracts or vested rights of individuals or private 
corporations.”). For an application of the due process clause in article I, section 2, 
of the Louisiana Constitution, see example, Morial, 785 So. 2d at 13 (citing Bd. 
of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 496 So. 2d at 287–88). 
 101. The federal provisions likewise do not protect public entities. For an 
application of the federal Due Process Clause, found in the Fourteenth Amendment, 
see example, Warren County, Mississippi v. Hester, 54 So. 2d 12, 18 (La. 1951) 
(“[I]t is plain that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, declaring 
that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, 
is utterly without application to the political subdivisions of a state, which cannot 
be viewed as a person within the purview of the constitutional provision.”). For an 
application of the Contracts Clause in Article I, section 10, clause 1, see example, 
City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Ever 
since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
it has been apparent that public entities which are political subdivisions of states 
do not possess constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from state 
impairment of contractual obligations, in the same sense as private corporations 
or individuals.” (citation omitted)). 




right is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due 
process.”102 When a levee district103 obtains such a property right, however, 
that right belongs to the state and is subject to abridgment regardless of 
whether the right has vested.104 To be sure, no matter how SLFPA-E is 
classified, neither the federal nor state constitutions save its lawsuit because 
its status as either a state agency or some other political subdivision 
disqualifies the board from that vested-right protection.105 Likewise, the 
board’s apparent dual identity as agency or political subdivision does not 
protect any possible contractual obligations the board may have.106 
Ultimately, although this law may seem to be an unfair surprise from what 
SLFPA-E expected upon filing its claim, that party’s status deprives it of the 
usual defenses against a retroactive law.107 The second constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 102. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 33 (La. 2008), 
amended on reh’g (Sept. 19, 2008) (citing Walls v. Am. Optical Corp., 740 So. 
2d 1262, 1268 (La. 1999)). 
 103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:330.1(A)(1) (Supp. 2015) (“The Southeast 
Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East and Southeast Louisiana Flood 
Protection Authority-West Bank, referred to herein as ‘flood protection authority’ 
or ‘authority,’ are established as levee districts pursuant to Article VI, Sections 38 
and 38.1 of the Constitution of Louisiana.”).  
 104. Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 496 So. 2d at 288–89. 
 105. If the levee authority is an agency, it is a “creature of the state,” and does 
not enjoy due process rights against state action. State ex rel. Kemp v. City of 
Baton Rouge, 40 So. 2d 477, 482 (La. 1949) (“It is the settled jurisprudence that 
counties and municipalities are creatures of the State, established for the purpose 
of providing effective government with functions, powers, duties and obligations 
delegated or imposed by the State and that there is nothing in the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution 
of the United States which would prohibit the State from making any change of 
such functions, powers and obligations.” (emphasis added)). The same result is 
obtained if the authority should be classified as a “political subdivision.” Morial, 
785 So. 2d at 13 (citing Hester, 54 So. 2d at 18). 
 106. See generally Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 496 So. 2d 281 
(interchangeably referring the Orleans Levee District as an agency and political 
subdivision and concluding that it was not immune from statute allegedly 
affecting district’s obligations); Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 633 
So. 2d 1235, 1247 (La. 1994) (“This state may constitutionally pass retrospective 
laws waiving or impairing its own rights or those of its subdivisions, or imposing 
upon itself or its subdivisions new liabilities with respect to transactions already 
passed, as long as private rights are not infringed.”). 
 107. In addition to this analysis, substantial support exists for the state’s 
exercise of police power in regulating the oil and gas industry, especially when 
the law only applies to state bodies. See Allain v. Martco P’ship, 851 So. 2d 974, 
980 (La. 2003) (“The United States Constitution Fourteenth Amendment and the 




argument against the retroactive law does not focus on the law’s effect on 
the plaintiff individually—it instead focuses on Act 544’s attempt to remove 
an action from the grips of the judiciary. 
b. Act 544 Does Not Infringe Upon the Judiciary’s Independence 
In Morial, the city of New Orleans also opposed the retroactive law on 
the grounds that the law was the product of the legislature exercising “power 
properly belonging to [the] judicial branch of government,” presumably 
because the city had already filed its claim when the legislature enacted the 
law.108 Similarly, SLFPA-E contended that because its “claims were already 
within the jurisdiction of the courts,” the legislature improperly infringed on 
the judiciary’s independence.109 Although violations of the separation of 
powers doctrine operate as a constitutional bar to retroactive application,110 
both SLFPA-E and the city of New Orleans misinterpreted the law.  
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Morial held that the retroactive statute 
did not violate separation of powers principles, supporting its conclusion by 
citing only cases regarding divestiture of rights without citing any direct 
authority on separation of powers.111 Although a more thorough explanation 
would have avoided misinterpretation, this analysis was proper. Importantly, 
the statute at issue in Morial was a substantive change in the law.112 The 
                                                                                                             
Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 2 and 4 serve as a reasonable restriction 
on the exercise of the State’s police power. In City of Shreveport v. Curry, 357 
So. 2d 1078 (La.1978), this Court defined ‘police power’ as the power of a 
governmental body that reasonably regulate [sic] the citizens’ actions in order to 
protect or promote public health, safety, morals, peace or general welfare.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 108. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 19. 
 109. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Louisiana Act 544, supra note 64, at 23.  
 110. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 404 (La. 
2005) (“Notwithstanding, even when the Legislature has expressed its intent to 
give a substantive law retroactive effect, the law many not be applied retroactively 
if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested rights. In a like vein, 
interpretative legislation may also not be applied retroactively if the legislative 
change violates the principles of separation of powers and independence of the 
judiciary.” (citation omitted)). 
 111. Morial, 785 So. 2d at 19.  
 112. The Louisiana Supreme Court does not label Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 40:1799 as “substantive” in the separation of powers discussion, but it 
does explain that “[t]he legislature has always enjoyed the power to create new 
rights and abolish old ones as long as it does not interfere with vested rights.” Id. 
at 19. 




Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Morial was made in light of prior 
decisions where the Court held that when a law is not “interpretive,” and 
affects substantive change in legal rights, a separation of powers discussion is 
unnecessary and the only remaining question is whether the law improperly 
affects vested rights or contractual obligations.113 Thus, retroactive laws have 
the potential to violate the separation of powers principle only if the law is 
“interpretive,” not substantive.  
“Interpretive laws” are those that “do not create new rules, but merely 
establish the meaning that the interpretive statute had from the time of its 
enactment.”114 Even though the legislature explicitly provides that a law is 
both interpretive and retroactive, the law may not retroactively overrule a 
court’s previous interpretation of a long-standing law.115 The leading cases on 
retroactive violations of separation of powers are confined to their facts—the 
cases dealt exclusively with interpretive laws that expressly overruled judicial 
decisions.116 Thus, even if Act 544 is interpretive, the law does not violate the 
separation of powers principle because Act 544 does not purport to overrule 
or alter a previous court’s decision regarding the law’s interpretation or 
                                                                                                             
 113. This concept is not novel. The Louisiana Supreme Court has previously 
recognized that a discussion of separation of powers was unnecessary because of 
its ultimate determination that the retroactive law was substantive. St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 819 (La. 1992) (“It is this interplay 
between the legislative and judicial branches that raises the separation of powers 
issue which we note, but do not resolve, as we find the amendment to [Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section] 23:1103(B) is not interpretive.” (emphasis added)). 
 114. Id. at 817. 
 115. Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at 406 (“By passing 2002 La. Acts 85 in 
order to abrogate the appellate court’s interpretation and application of a long-
standing revised statute, the Legislature clearly assumed a function more properly 
entrusted to the judicial branch of government.” (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring))). 
 116. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533, 543–44 (La. 
2005) (“In Unwired, this court recently addressed the issue of whether legislation 
designated as interpretive and intended to be applied retroactively violates the 
principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary. In that case, 
as in this one, the legislature passed an Act seeking to legislatively ‘overrule’ a 
prior judicial decision. This court concluded that by passing the Act to abrogate a 
court’s interpretation and application of a long-standing revised statute, the 
legislature ‘clearly assumed a function more properly entrusted to the judicial 
branch of government.”’ (quoting Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at 406)). 




application;117 merely changing the law before a court reviews that law does 
not encroach on judicial independence. 118 
Act 544, however, is truly substantive and, thus, poses no problems 
related to separation of powers. A “substantive law” will “either establish 
new rules, rights, and duties or change existing ones.”119 These laws focus 
on an actual change in a party’s rights.120 Although some legislators sold Act 
544 as a “clarification” of existing law—presumably section 49:214.36(D), 
which grants causes of action to certain parties—rather than a creation of new 
law,121 one should classify the law by examining its effects, without giving 
regard to labels. Although the causes of action granted to specific parties in 
section (D) remained, Act 544 abolished claims not only “arising from or 
related to any use as defined by R.S. 49:214.23(13)” and “activity subject to 
permitting under R.S. 49:214.21 et seq.,”122 but also those causes of action 
relating to any activity subject to federal law and permitting.123 Act 544, 
then, contemplates a much broader range of claims than the previous law 
did, constituting a considerable alteration of rules and affected parties’ 
rights. Under Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, Act 544 does not 
violate separation of powers principles, because that law substantively 
                                                                                                             
 117. The only decision even citing Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
49:214.36(D), which appears to control which parties may sue over matters 
included in SLFPA-E’s petition, discussed federal preemption of the state law, 
not what parties are properly asserting claims for federal and state permitting 
violations. BP Am. Inc. v. Chustz, 33 F. Supp. 3d 676 (M.D. La. 2014). 
 118. See, e.g., Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1309–10 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(“The amendment did not alter a court-created doctrine for at that time there was 
no ‘authoritative judicial interpretation of Louisiana statutory law pertinent to a 
physician’s duty toward his patient.’” (quoting Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & 
Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1339 (La. 1978))). 
 119. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 817 (La. 1992). 
 120. See Rebecca Barrett Hall, Comment, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: 
Dressing-Up Substantive Legislation to Trigger the Interpretive Exception to 
Retroactivity Violates Constitutional Principles, 67 LA. L. REV. 599, 614 (2007) 
(“Thus, laws can be sorted by examining a single characteristic: interpretive 
classification should rely on clarification of original legislative intent, and 
substantive classification should depend on creation or alteration of existing 
rights.”). 
 121. See Ballard, supra note 19. 
 122. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.36(O)(1) (Supp. 2015).  
 123. Specifically, Act 544 contemplates the laws in 33 U.S.C. § 408 (taking 
possession of, use of, or injury to harbor or river improvements) and 33 U.S.C. § 1344 
(permits for dredged or fill material). 




amends existing law,124 which only leaves questions related to parties’ 
rights.125  
2. Act 544 Does Not Qualify as a Prohibited Local or Special Law 
The principle that only general matters should be the focus of lawmakers’ 
resources and attention is well established.126 The Louisiana Constitution 
provides that “the legislature shall not pass a local or special law” concerning 
certain enumerated topics.127 The right-stripping provisions in laws like Act 
544 apply prospectively to a range of potential claimants, but the law’s context 
suggests that the legislature aimed the law at a particular target—the pending 
suit. Just like the SLFPA-E, the city of New Orleans in Morial was the only 
party with a pending suit that the new law would affect.128 The city argued 
that the law’s retroactive application impermissibly targeted its suit, 
violating the constitutional prohibition against local and special laws.129 
In addition to violations of individual rights and separation of powers 
principles, one must also recognize this constitutional provision as an 
exception to the validity of a retroactive law. Before determining whether a 
law impermissibly deals with those enumerated topics, the court in Morial 
explained that first classifying the law as “local” or “special” is necessary; 
only then can one analyze the law under this rule.130 Specifically in the 
context of the Local Government Article, the constitution defines a valid 
“general law” as “a law of statewide concern enacted by the legislature 
which is uniformly applicable to all persons or to all political subdivisions 
in the state or which is uniformly applicable to all persons or to all political 
subdivisions within the same class.”131 
The Morial court relied heavily on its previous decision in Kimball v. 
Allstate Insurance Co. to conclude that the law at issue was valid and general 
in nature.132 Kimball elaborated that a “local law” is one concerned with 
geographical application; a local law “operates only in a particular locality 
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or localities without the possibility of extending its coverage to other areas 
should the requisite criteria exist or come to exist there.”133 Act 544’s first 
section abolishes causes of action for a class of parties without geographic 
limitation—the phrase “state or local governmental entity” does not connote 
application to any specific area of the state.134 Section 5 of Act 544, however, 
contains a savings clause for all governmental entities with an exception 
expressly naming “a local or regional flood protection authority.”135 
Currently, only two such entities exist in the state—the Southeast Louisiana 
Flood Protection Authority-East and -West—both of which are located in the 
southeast region of the state.136 Thus, one could consider Act 544 
“immediately suspect as a local law,” because the law’s operation “is limited 
to certain parishes.”137  
Several reasons exist for specifying why the levee authorities in this 
manner do not bring Act 544 within the definition of a “local” law. First, 
Act 544 has the potential to apply to areas outside the southeast region of 
the state if the lawmakers decide to create additional authorities, something 
that is well within their power.138 In addition to the law’s ability for future 
application, just because the levee authority was the only “state or local 
governmental entity” with a pending suit when the law took effect does not 
mean the law was local.139 Lastly, though the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
suggested that a law’s application may be tied to naturally occurring, 
measurable criteria such as “population, size or physical characteristics,” the 
Louisiana Supreme Court has not restricted the mechanism for determining 
a law’s expanded application to this type of criteria.140  
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Further, where a reasonable distinction supports the legislature’s 
geographic limitation, the narrow application of the law may be 
constitutional.141 Act 544 likely specified “local or regional flood protection 
authority” because of the urgency of ending the litigation. Alternatively, 
those flood protection authorities may be unique “governmental entities” in 
a disaster-prone area of the state, such that the legislature wishes to deny 
them access to certain property damage claims. Further, a law is not “local” 
when “persons throughout the state are affected by it or it operates on a 
subject in which the people at large are interested.”142 The board’s ability to 
file certain suits may not directly affect citizens elsewhere in the state, but 
determining how to regulate such a pervasive industry and how the 
government implements that regulation are certainly statewide interests. 
Because this exception to the local law prohibition is a type of deference to 
the state’s police power,143 the state’s restriction on its own creation should 
supersede any concerns relating to a “local” law, especially when that entity 
is being prevented from involvement in litigation against an industry subject 
to the state’s police power.144  
Next, the Louisiana Supreme Court has defined a “special law” as “one 
which operates upon and affects only a fraction of the persons . . . 
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encompassed by a classification, granting privileges to some persons while 
denying them to others.”145 Although Act 544 specifically excepted SLFPA-
E from the savings clause provision, the law applies equally to all entities 
that fall into the distinct class of flood authorities—the “general body”—
and it does not single out any one in particular.146 Further, like the 
jurisprudential rule on “local” laws, “special” laws have a similar exception 
based on the state’s reasonable basis for the law’s narrow application.147 The 
legislature may have considered particular property damage claims 
unnecessary or improper in light of the levee authorities’ special roles of 
monitoring flood prevention. Thus, the state may have similar policy 
reasons for holding the law’s application to this particular set of 
governmental actors, as the legislature did for removing these causes of 
action from the special geographically situated entities. 
Thus, Act 544 does not fall into the requisite categories of “local” or 
“special” laws,148 obviating the need to apply the law to the enumerated list 
of prohibited subjects.149 Additionally, the only questionable provision in 
Act 544 is Section 5, which specifically applies to the flood protection 
authorities.150 Even if a court later determines that section is invalid, the law 
is severable if the remaining provisions of the law can still have effect in 
that section’s absence.151 Although Act 544 is a permissible general law as 
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applied to the flood authorities, the state constitution provides for those 
entities, which may limit the law’s effect on their established powers. 
B. The Levee Authority’s Constitutional Origins Do Not Provide Immunity  
Whereas the United States Constitution grants power to the federal 
government, Louisiana’s constitution is a restriction on the otherwise 
unabridged power of the state.152 Thus, the legislature is free to pass any law 
that does not violate some specific constitutional provision153 that was 
impliedly or expressly154 meant to prevent the legislative action.155 The same 
principle applies to laws affecting the powers of constitutionally established 
entities.156 
In Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., the Louisiana 
Supreme Court considered amendments to the framework of administrative 
law that affected powers of the commissioner of insurance.157 The court offered 
a detailed history of the commissioner’s office to explain that no specifically 
listed duties or powers that were protected from legislative alteration appeared 
anywhere in the office’s establishment.158 The constitutional delegates, the 
court noted, clearly contemplated whether to place the specific powers and 
duties of the commissioner in the constitution or leave those determinations to 
the legislature.159 Ultimately, the constitutional delegates wrote the provision so 
that the office “has no powers, functions or duties allocated to [it] by the 
constitution.”160  
The Louisiana Constitution provides for the legislature’s ability to establish 
regional flood protection authorities but does not provide the entities with any 
particular powers that Act 544 affected. The 2006 amendments to the Local 
Governmental Article of the Constitution lay out only three specific powers 
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of the regional districts: “(a) to levy taxes in such areas [and] prohibit the 
levy of taxes provided for in this Section in such areas, (b) to employ and 
provide for its employees, or (c) to own, construct, and maintain its 
property.”161 Although the originating provision details several purposes of 
the levee authority, even some unlisted and “incidental” to those listed, these 
purposes do not constitute specific grants of power. Instead, “[t]he 
legislature by law may establish regional flood protection authorities . . . and 
provide for their territorial jurisdiction, governing authority, powers, duties, 
and functions. . . .”162 
Following the constitutional amendments establishing the flood 
protection authorities, the legislature provided “by law” for their powers, 
duties, restrictions, jurisdiction, and guidelines for the boards of 
commissioners.163 The SLFPA-E is also considered a levee district, so its 
board has the legislatively granted ability to sue and be sued.164 That ability 
is now a general rule to which Act 544’s restriction on particular causes of 
action operates as an exception.165 Just as in Wooley, Act 544 does not affect 
the SLFPA-E’s constitutionally listed powers—its ability to levy taxes, 
employ and pay its employees, or own, construct and maintain its property. 
Rather, Act 544 is a valid exercise of the state’s authority unrestrained by 
the constitution. The legislature’s ability to alter the powers granted to an 
agency goes to the heart of administrative law and the system of checks and 
balances. Through the state’s democratic pronouncement, the legislature 
chose to regulate coastal activity through a permitting framework and only 
allow particular entities to sue on related matters.  
III. ACT 544 IS A NECESSARY SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM 
Though serious questions persist regarding when and how the state 
should hold industry players responsible for violations and potential damage 
to the coast, the SLFPA-E’s attempted method is not the appropriate means. 
The state’s existing coastal regulatory framework, as well as several policy 
concerns, demonstrate that Act 544 was the preferred solution. 
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A. How Does the Lawsuit Fit into the Framework of Coastal Regulation? 
The legislature has set up an entire body of law to regulate the coastal 
zone and those persons who use the zone.166 The secretary of the Department 
of Natural Resources is in charge of administering the state’s coastal 
management program,167 which federal law approved and which governs 
Louisiana’s coast.168 A part of Louisiana’s plan delegates to coastal parishes 
the ability to issue coastal use permits after developing an approved 
program.169 The secretary constantly scrutinizes both the permitting 
decisions170 and programs developed at the local level “to ensure continued 
consistency with the state program, guidelines, and with the policies and 
purpose” of the state’s coastal management.171 The secretary and each parish 
with an approved local coastal program have the ability to conduct “field 
surveillance,”172 “issue cease and desist orders,”173 “suspend, revoke, or 
modify” permits,174 and “bring such injunctive, declaratory, or other actions 
as are necessary to ensure” compliance with the permitting framework along 
the coast.175 Notably, however, the legislature has not entitled the flood 
protection authorities to these actions. 
The state did not create the SLFPA-E to file suits to enforce regulations 
on the state’s wetlands or permitted uses thereof, nor does that flood 
protection authority have the power to do so. Under the statutory provisions 
governing which entities have the ability to enforce coastal-use standards, 
the SLFPA-E is not a local government with an approved permitting 
program.176 That fact alone, however, does not deprive the SLFPA-E of 
potential enforcement action. The enforcement section of the Louisiana 
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Coastal Zone Management Program provides that “local political 
subdivision[s]” without such a program may still enforce “any ordinance or 
regulation relating to wetlands protection or restoration.”177 The terms 
“wetlands” and “permit,” however, do not appear in any of the regional 
flood authorities’ constitutional or statutory establishments.178  
The legislature specifically created these authorities to construct and 
maintain flood prevention systems in their jurisdictions.179 Their inferior 
role in regulating use of the coastal zone in general is apparent in several 
provisions in the Coastal Zone Management Act.180 By attempting to 
address regulatory matters itself, the Board of Commissioners for SLFPA-
E hastily upset a plan of administration the state has tailored over several 
decades.181 The legislature did not intend for local bodies to handle this 
regulatory framework for the coast alone, especially by means of 
unpredictable, high-stakes litigation.  
Several factors of the lawsuit make its resolution potentially 
problematic for the industry’s oversight. A government subdivision—a 
piece of the larger regulatory machine—can significantly affect the 
regulated industry with a suit like SLFPA-E’s. As opposed to “traditional 
suits,”182 litigation that focuses on future change and which asks the court to 
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assess normative values183 can function as a substitution for democratically 
approved law. As an area of statewide concern, the oil and gas industry’s 
regulation falls under the state’s police power.184 In this instance, SLFPA-E 
has prayed for a judgment that forces the defendant companies to take actions 
beyond remedying past harms based on quasi-legislative determinations 
regarding who should bear responsibility for the entity’s financial woes.185 
This type of “regulation through litigation,” although suspect as an 
inappropriate means of handling an entire industry’s operations in the state, 
has expansive implications both for the individual levee boards and the state’s 
industry management as a whole.186 The courts should replace the 
legislature’s role, especially at the unapproved request of one of the state’s 
inferior bodies.187 Ultimately, SLFPA-E’s decision to file the suit does not 
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coincide with the regulation’s effectiveness, because the flood protection 
authority attempted to circumvent the uniform democratic voice by seeking 
to impose its own view of the industry’s responsibility. 
Further, the lawsuit’s outcome has the potential for unforeseen 
consequences. The nature of SLFPA-E’s claims has drawn attention to 
whether the potential judgment might affect the similarly situated agencies 
in an indirect way. For example, the only other flood protection authority in 
the state, Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-West, expressed 
its disapproval of the unusual suit, citing concerns that the suit’s 
implications would reach far beyond the board’s territorial jurisdiction.188 
Additionally, SLFPA-E’s requested remedy may involve processes beyond 
its power to compel. For instance, the board requested that, at the court’s 
discretion, the court force the defendant companies to backfill dredged 
canals, which is an activity under the supervision of the secretary and the 
Army Corps of Engineers.189 Although the levee authority has perhaps 
stepped into a regulatory role for which the legislature did not create the 
authority, the SLFPA-E’s intended responsibilities remain and its ability to 
fulfill these responsibilities should not suffer as a result of the board of 
commissioners’ hasty decision. Act 544 effectively resolves both issues. 
B. Act 544 is the Preferred Solution 
The legislature corrected the inappropriate lawsuit by means of an after-
the-fact denial of access to the courts. Without considering the specific 
circumstances, this action might appear as an attempt to shield political and 
financial interests. Although the situation might at first appear to involve 
poor gamesmanship and political puppetry, in context, Act 544’s effect was 
actually corrective in nature—a hard and fast solution to a potentially 
destructive situation.  
Among the many efforts to defeat SLFPA-E’s suit was an attempt by 
the governor and the legislature to alter the board’s membership. Months 
before the 2014 legislative session, the governor’s opposition to the lawsuit 
led to his unprecedented rejection of the board’s nominations for vacant 
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positions.190 After making clear that he would reject any board member who 
opposed his viewpoint,191 the governor followed through by removing and 
subsequently instating three commissioners based on their stances on the 
lawsuit.192 In an attempt to legitimize the governor’s politically motivated 
rejections, the legislature later proposed an amendment to the flood 
protection authority’s governing law that would eradicate some political 
immunity that the board members enjoyed.193 Subsequent amendments 
softened the bill’s effects, ultimately proposing that the governor have the 
power to remove a commissioner in light of state law or policy violations.194 
The legislature has not yet enacted this proposed law and probably never 
will, assuming the lawmakers remain true to their concerns over effective, 
consistent regulation. Arguably, such political influences were exactly what 
the legislature intended to avoid with the authorities’ post-Hurricane Katrina 
creation.195 If SLFPA-E was indeed incorrect in filing this lawsuit because 
their original, specific duty is to maintain flood systems, which is a highly 
technical and specialized task, then the legislature should not alter the 
board’s membership and appointment process. The entity’s grave task of 
overseeing effective flood diversion and prevention naturally calls for 
objective determinations, which are best handled by parties that are truly 
qualified and not motivated by political appeasements.  
Act 544, specifically the provision that eliminates SLFPA-E’s cause of 
action, halts the lawsuit and preserves the entity’s integrity as an expertise-
driven body. Thus, the law does not diminish the entity’s ability to carry out 
its intended tasks. Though the board may not now sue on certain claims of 
regulatory import, the board is still left with all previously held capabilities, 
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including the ability to maintain unbiased membership and the power to file 
suit on non-prohibited matters. As for accomplishing the end goal, Act 544 
justifiably attempted to prevent litigation from improperly serving as a 
regulation that a state entity imposed inappropriately.196 Laws regulating 
such a complex industry require a consistent, statewide pronouncement. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court has previously offered its sentiment on this type 
of action, making Act 544’s eventual approval all the more likely.197  
The lawsuit’s potential for affecting the state’s ability to uniformly 
regulate an area subject to its police power might make Act 544 an 
understandable remedy in this instance, but the larger policy concern of 
holding the companies responsible still remains. Coastal residents believe 
that the oil and gas companies are at least partially responsible for the coastal 
wetland problems, and these companies likely will not voluntarily restore 
the damage done.198 A passive view of the facts surrounding SLFPA-E’s 
lawsuit and the corresponding retroactive law may puzzle some—the 
legislature has taken serious strides to limit lawsuits against parties whom 
the public feels are responsible. Regardless of Act 544’s immediate effects, 
however, the companies remain susceptible to serious liability for these 
issues. 
This Comment does not intend to suggest that litigation against oil and 
gas companies is categorically improper. Along with the public’s perception 
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of the situation,199 empirical data suggests that oil and gas production has 
contributed to coastal land loss.200 The legislature appears to be responsive 
to these concerns and has established a framework that allows for sizeable 
lawsuits against those companies in the industry.201 Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 214.36(D) expressly grants a cause of action for coastal 
zone violations to many coastal parish governments.202 More notably, none 
of the legislature’s industry protections have affected private citizens with 
proper standing. Compared to the way other states have handled instances 
of reoccurring lawsuits against an industry, Louisiana’s restrictions have 
been mild.203  
Looking forward, the legislature is capable of preventing this kind of 
unwanted scenario created by an unauthorized state actor. The more state 
lawmakers and administrators address the industry’s problems—for 
example, the growing concerns over coastal land loss and the companies’ 
role in taking responsibility—the more likely courts are to defer to the 
legislature’s studied findings.204 Also, the state should continue to act 
carefully when creating and providing powers for state entities in the 
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constitution, clearly indicating to a court that the legislature intends to retain 
the ability to modify the entity, such as in Wooley.205 This indication would 
keep public entities democratically adjustable. Additionally, explicitly 
providing for how a particular entity may seek redress of any disputes, 
financial or otherwise, may be wise. By proactively imposing express 
limitations on the avenues a governmental body may pursue for alleged 
violations in its jurisdiction, the legislature can avoid many of these 
problems. 
CONCLUSION 
A casual survey of the Act and its context supports many state and 
national concerns of whether the oil and gas industry will ever be held 
accountable in Louisiana.206 When viewed in the context of SLFPA-E’s 
intended role, however, Act 544 appears legitimate, especially in light of the 
Coastal Zone Management Program framework. Not only did the 
lawmakers act well within their legal capacity, but they also retained the 
final say on coastal development regulation inside the democratic process. 
Louisiana finds itself between a rock—the continuously growing 
energy development industry—and a hard place—the collective opinions of 
society and the scientific community. The oil and gas industry’s role on the 
coast is clearly an issue of statewide concern, as the issue permeates 
everyday conversation many miles from the Gulf. The size of the oil and gas 
industry brings that industry within the cross hairs of Louisiana’s political 
and economic interests. Importantly, the state has precedent both from 
Louisiana and elsewhere that can be instructive on how to handle such a 
publicly criticized, highly regulated industry. Just as in those instances 
before, state policymakers should remain flexible in handling the scenario, 
specifically responding to their constituents’ concerns not just for obvious 
political reasons but also to proactively prevent regulatory disruption. The 
judiciary and the public are more inclined to feel the industry is being 
properly policed the more state policymakers take clear stances on important 
issues in the coast’s development. But as for resolving already existing 
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oversights in industry-wide regulatory frameworks, narrow laws like Act 
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